Its aim was to re-examine the role of all the local actors in the struggle for Palestine in the light of old and recently declassified archival resources. The contributors to this volume came from different backgrounds: some from Israel, some from the Arab world, and some from the West. Regardless of our provenance, we were all united by a commitment to explore, with the help of the best evidence we could find, the causes, the course, and the consequences of this fateful war. Our common purpose was to understand, not to impute shame or allocate blame. It was Edward Said, a long-time friend of the Middle East Centre in Oxford, who first suggested to us the idea of bringing Arab and Israeli scholars together to rewrite the history of the Palestine War. Edward himself wrote eloquently, in his contribution to this volume and in other places, on the need for Arab intellectuals to come to terms with their history and on the importance of looking simultaneously at both sides of the hill, of writing history contrapuntally, as he liked to put it. He also believed that a broad understanding of the historical roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential for its resolution. Edward Said died on 25 September 2003. His essay, "Afterword: The Consequences of 1948," is reprinted here without any changes. We wish to dedicate this second edition of the TheWar for Palestine to the memory of this outstanding intellectual who spent a lifetime grappling with the complexities of the Palestine question.
The original version of this book was a product of its time: a contribution to the rewriting of the history of the first Arab-Israeli war rather than xvii a definitive or comprehensive study of the subject. In the Introduction to the first edition we noted that there were some omissions, notably a treatment of Lebanon. Despite our best efforts, we were unable to find a historian capable of writing a chapter on Lebanon in 1948. Nor could we think of a possible contributor on Saudi Arabia and the 1948 War. Recently, however, we identified two scholars who were able and willing to fill in these two particular gaps. This encouraged us to start thinking about a second edition of The War for Palestine. The volume in front of you is the result. This is a revised and expanded edition of the book that first appeared in 2001. All the original contributors to that book, with the exception of the late Edward Said, were offered an opportunity to revise their chapters. All the authors, including the two editors, were content to let their chapters be reprinted in their original form.
The two substantive additions to this volume are the chapter by Matthew Hughes on Lebanon and the chapter by Madawi Al-Rasheed on Saudi Arabia. In the vast literature on the 1948 War Lebanon hardly features at all, because it was the weakest of the Arab states and because the role played by its army in the fighting was extremely marginal. Matthew Hughes begins by noting that Lebanon was a belligerent in 1948 in name only but goes on to shed a great deal of new light on the internal sectarian divisions that went such a long way to account for the country's military passivity. In particular he shows that the Christian-dominated government had a long history of collusion with Zionists and that it deliberately held back the army following the outbreak of hostilities. By giving details of the size of the Lebanese forces, Hughes helps to further undermine the myth of a Jewish David confronting an Arab Goliath. He also engages with the arguments of the other contributors on the discord and disharmony that prevailed within the ranks of the Arab coalition that confronted Israel. And he joins in the consensus that it was the inability of the Arab states to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies that was in no small measure responsible for their defeat on the battlefield.
Madawi Al-Rasheed's chapter on Saudi Arabia fits very neatly into this general picture of a divided and dysfunctional Arab coalition. Like Lebanon's, Saudi Arabia's attitude to the War for Palestine was hesitant and ambivalent, and its contribution to the fighting was totally insignificant. And like all the other Arab states, Saudi Arabia pursued a national agenda while paying lip-service to Arab unity. Rivalry with Jordan rather than commitment to the Palestinian cause emerges as the driving force behind Saudi policy during the war. Madawi Al-Rasheed draws on a wide range of hitherto unused Arabic sources to get beyond the official history of Saudi Arabia and the Palestine War. In doing so, she By far the most controversial of the recent crop of books is The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine by Ilan Pappé of Haifa University. 5 Pappé is a prominent member of the original group of "new historians" and the most radical among them. He is the author of several serious books on the making of the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the history of Palestine. Many Palestinians regard him as Israel's most courageous, most principled, and most incisive historian. Within Israel, on the other hand, he is isolated, ostracized, and much maligned. The main charge against him is that he has a political axe to grind. His critics allege that he writes not as a dispassionate scholar but with the aim of delegitimizing the State of Israel and For the Palestinians, statelessness has always posed a real problem in the archiving of historic documents. The Institute for Palestine Studies, established in Beirut in 1963, has long sought to fill the gap in documentation through its library, which also holds an extensive collection of original documents "pertaining to Palestinian political leaders, national committees, and political parties, consisting of personal papers, memoirs, minutes of meetings and conferences, and photographs." 6 The Institute has published a number of memoirs giving first-hand Palestinian accounts of the 1948 War, several since the first edition of The War for Palestine.
7 Perhaps the most significant new primary source on the Palestinian experience of 1948 has come through oral history. A number of oral history projects preserving the memories of the Nakba, or Palestinian "Catastrophe," on audio and video record are accessible via the universal archive of the internet. 9 The author served as a junior officer in the Jordanian army in 1948, he retired from the army with the rank of Major-General, and he proceeded to do a doctorate in history at the University of Oxford. His latest book is based on extensive Arabic sources, both published and unpublished, research in the Public Record Office, and personal information from other participants in the war. Although it contains a great deal of new and valuable information, the book adheres firmly to the loyalist view of Jordan's role in the struggle for Palestine. It does not engage, for example, with the thesis of collusion between King Abdullah and the Zionist movement against the Palestinians before, during, and after the war. Consequently, it might be helpful to assess Ma an Abu Nowar's book in relation to the work of two Israeli scholars who advance the thesis of "collusion across the Jordan," Uri Bar-Joseph 10 and Avi Shlaim.
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One major change between the first and second editions of the present book relates to the political context in which history is written. History is the past seen through the prism of the present. In the late 1990s, when this project was conceived, public opinion in Israel seemed increasingly receptive to the ideas of the "new history." Many of the claims that a decade earlier were denounced as dangerous revisionism began to be incorporated into the intellectual mainstream. Some of the findings of the new history, like those of Benny Morris on the expulsion of Palestinians, even found their way into history textbooks for secondary schools. Our unspoken assumption at the time was that the new historians would bring about a quiet revolution in the way in which their compatriots viewed their past. This assumption turned out to be overly optimistic. In the last few years various developments in the political arena have made the Israeli public more suspicious of the new interpretations of the past and more receptive to the old ones. The breakdown of the Oslo peace process, the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, and the rise to power of Ariel Sharon at the head of a Likud-dominated government in February 2001 resulted in a swing in public opinion away from the new history towards the old history.
Six months before the election, Ariel Sharon was asked what changes he thought the education system needed. Sharon replied: "I would like them to study the history of the people of Israel and the land of Israel . . . the children must be taught Jewish-Zionist values, and the 'new historians' must not be taught." Underlying this reply was a sense, widely shared among the country's conservatives, that the new historians were undermining patriotic values and young people's confidence in the justice of their cause. Sharon's aim was to nullify the effect of the new historians and to reassert traditional values in the educational system. Likud's return to power brought in its wake a regression to fundamentalist positions in relation to the Palestinians and the reassertion of a narrow, nationalist perspective on Israel's history. Limor Livnat, the education minister, launched an all-out offensive against the new history, post-Zionism, and all other manifestations of what she views as the defeatism and appeasement that paved the way to the Oslo Accord. One of the first things that Ms Livnat did on becoming minister of education was to order new history textbooks for secondary schools to be written, removing all traces of the influence of the new historians.
In addition to these officially instigated attacks, two other developments helped to weaken the cohesion and the credibility of the new historiography. One was the Teddy Katz affair; the other was the defection of Benny Morris. Teddy Katz submitted in 1998 a master's thesis that made extensive use of oral history. The thesis dealt with a massacre allegedly perpetrated by the Alexandroni Brigade in late May 1948 in the Arab village of Tantura, 35 kilometers south of Haifa. Katz's finding that more than 200 Tantura villagers were shot after the village surrendered was reported in the Israeli press in January 2000. This unleashed a storm of protest, culminating in a libel suit brought by veterans of the Alexandroni Brigade against Katz. The court case prompted Haifa University to institute an internal inquiry that led to Katz being stripped of his master's degree.
In the academic controversy that ensued, a number of scholars came to the defence of Teddy Katz, notably Ilan Pappé of the University of Haifa. In Pappé's view, the case shed light on the extent to which mainstream Zionists are prepared to go to in discouraging research that brings to the fore such aspects of the 1948 War as "ethnic cleansing." 12 The controversy surrounding the case was bitter and overtly political. The critics called into question the credibility not only of Katz and Pappé but, by extension, of the entire school of new history.
The embattled new historians suffered an equally serious setback as a result of the defection of Benny Morris from their ranks. Following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, Morris's thinking about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its protagonists radically changed. In a series of newspaper articles and interviews he laid virtually all the blame for the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the return to violence at the door of the Palestinian Authority. He concluded that signing the Oslo Accord had been a mistake and that peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians is not possible. This pessimistic conclusion made him veer from left to right and to start advocating the "transfer" or expulsion of the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. It also led him to re-examine the experience of 1948 in the light of Israel's present predicament. In the past Morris had confined himself to dispassionate description and refrained from passing judgment on Israel's actions. In retrospect, however, it seemed to him that allowing a small minority of Palestinians to stay within the borders of the State of Israel was a mistake; that not only 700,000 but the whole lot should have been expelled. In fairness to Benny Morris it must be pointed out that his scholarly work is untainted by his xxii Preface to the second edition new political and ideological convictions. In his scholarly work he still meets the most exacting standards. Although he has distanced himself from the school of new history of which he was once the leading proponent, his contribution to our understanding of what happened in 1948 remains of critical importance. The debate about 1948 goes on and may it long continue to do so. Consequently, it is premature to pass a final verdict on the new history. When a journalist asked Chou En-lai a question about the impact of the French Revolution, the wise Chinese leader replied: "It is too soon to tell." The same may be true of the new history. But a review of the last two decades suggests that the new history has already had significant political consequences on at least four levels. First, it acted as a spur to a major advance in the teaching of history in most Israeli high schools. Second, it enabled ordinary members of the Israeli public to understand how Arabs perceive Israel and how they view the past. Third, it presented to the Arabs an account of the conflict which they recognize as honest and genuine, and in line with their own experience, instead of the usual propaganda of the victors. Fourth, it encouraged Arab historians, contributors to this volume among them, to examine more critically the conduct of their own community in this conflict in the light of the evidence that is now available. The result is the welcome development of a new history on the Arab side.
In all these different ways, the new history helped to create a climate, on both sides of the Israeli-Arab divide, which was conducive to the progress of the peace process. As Bishop Tutu pointed out in the South African context, it is difficult to know what to forgive unless we know what happened. In the Middle East, as in South Africa, it is necessary to understand the past in order to go forward. This brief survey also suggests an important link between the state of Arab-Israeli relations and popular attitudes towards the past. Just as disenchantment with the Likud government in the aftermath of the 1982 Lebanon War acted as a spur to the new history, disenchantment with the Palestinians following the return to violence served to isolate, marginalize, and even delegitimize the new historians. The more Israelis feel under threat, the more they retreat into familiar and self-justifying narratives of the past and the less tolerant they become of dissenting voices. But it is precisely in such times of crisis that dissenting voices are most vitally needed. A more complex and fair-minded understanding of the past is therefore essential for preserving at least the prospect of reconciliation in the future. The rewriting of the history of 1948 thus remains a practical as well as an academic imperative.
